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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Sanja Rose, AK.A Tucakovic, appeals from the district court's denial of her 
post-sentencing motion to withdraw her guilty plea to aiding and abetting the trafficking 
of heroin. On appeal she asserts that her alleged belief that she could avoid the 
mandatory minimum sentence by pleading guilty demonstrates manifest injustice. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
A grand jury indicted Rose on a charge of aiding and abetting the trafficking of 
heroin. (R., pp.6-7.) The case was consolidated with another case that charged 
possession of a controlled substance. (R., p.11; 4/5/2013 Tr., p.6, Ls.9-13.) Ultimately, 
Rose pleaded guilty to the trafficking charge in exchange for the state limiting its 
sentencing recommendation to eight years with the mandatory minimum three years 
fixed, and dismissing the possession charge. (R., pp.48-55; 4/5/2013 Tr., p.5, L.12 -
p.6, L.13.) In taking Rose's guilty plea, the district court ensured that she understood 
that the court was required to impose a minimum fixed term of three years for the crime. 
(4/5/2013 Tr., p.14, L.17 - p.15, L.6.) Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the district 
court entered a judgment of conviction against Rose and sentenced her to a unified 
term of seven years with the mandatory minimum of three years fixed. (R., pp.63-66.) 
Rose filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.74-75.) 
Thereafter, Rose filed a motion to set aside her guilty plea, asserting that her 
plea was involuntary because she believed she could avoid the mandatory minimum 
sentence. (R., pp.84-87.) The district court held a hearing on the motion (R., pp.96-98; 
1/17/2014 Tr.), and invited the parties to submit written closing arguments and left open 
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the option for oral presentations (1/17/2014 Tr., p.77, L.10 - p.78, L.18). The parties 
submitted the written closing arguments (R., pp.105-31) and later presented oral 
arguments to the district court (See 5/2/2014 Tr.). After reviewing all of these materials, 
the district court denied Rose's motion to withdraw her guilty plea because she failed to 
show manifest injustice. (Memorandum and Order Concerning Defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea (Augmentation), hereinafter "Order.") 
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ISSUE 
Rose states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Rose's 
motion to withdraw her plea? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Rose failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
her post-sentencing motion to withdraw her guilty plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
Rose Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Her 
Post-Sentencing Motion To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Rose contends that the district court erred by denying her post-sentencing 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea to aiding and abetting the trafficking of heroin. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-9.) The district court, finding that Rose was attempting to 
withdraw her guilty plea because she was dissatisfied with her sentence and that Rose 
had failed to show manifest injustice, denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. 
(Order.) On appeal, Rose asserts that she showed manifest injustice because she 
asserted that her attorney said there was a chance she could avoid the mandatory 
minimum sentence of three years for aiding and abetting the trafficking of heroin. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this 
case, however, demonstrates that she has failed to satisfy her burden of showing 
manifest injustice or an abuse of discretion by the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion, as 
distinguished from arbitrary action. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 483, 861 P.2d 51, 53 
(1993). On appeal from the denial of a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea, the appellate court examines the entire record to determine whether it is 
manifestly unjust to preclude the defendant from withdrawing his guilty plea. State v. 
Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 574, 861 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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C. Rose Has Failed To Show Manifest Injustice 
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after 
sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281,284 (1990); Hoover 
v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458,459 (Ct. App. 1988). A court may permit a 
defendant to withdraw her guilty plea after sentencing only upon a satisfactory showing 
by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is necessary to correct a "manifest 
injustice." I.C.R. 33(c). The strictness of the standard is justified by the legal weight of 
the guilty plea: "A plea of guilty has the same force and effect as a judgment rendered 
after a full trial on the merits." Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 346, 647 P.2d 796, 802 
(Ct. App. 1982). Especially relevant to this case, the stricter standard also ensures that 
the defendant is not "encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential 
punishment and withdraw the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe." State v. 
Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Applying these correct legal standards to Rose's motion, which was based on her 
unrealized aspirations of a more lenient sentence, the district court correctly denied the 
motion. (Order, Augmentation.) The state adopts as part of its argument on appeal the 
district court's analysis contained within its "Memorandum and Order Concerning 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea," a copy of which is attached hereto as 
"Appendix A." 
On appeal, Rose asserts that her guilty plea was involuntary because, she 
claims, her attorney said he would try for a "Hail Mary" and creatively argue that, in spite 
of the mandatory minimum, the district court could consider probation. (Appellant's 
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brief, pp.3, 6-9.) Regardless of what her attorney's advice may have been,1 Rose was 
directly and in the clearest terms informed by the district court on multiple occasions 
prior to pronouncing sentence that her crime carried with it a mandatory minimum fixed 
term of at least three years. (See 4/5/2013 Tr., p.14, L.18 - p.15, L.6; 8/2/2013 Tr., 
p.43, L.12 - p.45, L.2.) The district court also explained that a fixed term meant she 
would be required to serve the time without the possibility of parole. (4/5/2013 Tr., p.15, 
Ls.12-16.) Even if there had been no legal impediment to placing Rose on probation, 
when the district court informed Rose that she would be sentenced to at least a fixed 
term of three years, that removed any reasonable expectation of a more lenient 
sentence. Rose's wholly unreasonable aspiration to be placed on probation does not 
make her guilty plea involuntary. 
The defendant has the burden of proving that the plea should be withdrawn. 
Stone, 147 Idaho at 333, 208 P.3d at 737; State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho 177, 178, 857 
P .2d 656, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). Rose failed to satisfy that burden. Rose's failure to 
receive the sentence she hoped for does not demonstrate manifest injustice. The 
district court correctly denied her post-sentencing motion to withdraw her guilty plea and 
should be affirmed. 
Contradicting Rose's assertions, her attorney testified during the hearing on her 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea that he had explained to her, as clearly as he could 
and many times, that the court would be required to impose a mandatory minimum fixed 
term of three years of imprisonment. (1/17/2014 Tr., p.56, L.21 - p.57, L.2; p.57, Ls.15-
21; p.62, L.1 - p.63, L.12; p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.7; p.69, L.5 - p.70, L.18.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Rose's post-sentencing motion to withdraw her guilty plea. 
DATED this 17th day of December, 2014. 
c~ RlJS.SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of December, 2014, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ,JUDICL\L DISTRICT OF 
THE ST.ATE Of IDA.HO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
PL.--\INTIFF, 
\'. 
SAN,J.\ ROSE, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______________ ) 
CASE NO. CR-FE-20012-0012226 
.'l'lEl\lORANDlJlVI AND ORDER 
CONCERNING f)g FENDANT'S 
;\[O'I'ION TO \NITHDRA W 
GUILTY PLEA 
Defondnnt Sanja Rose has moved pursuant to ICR 33(c) to withdraw her guilty 
plua to one count of trafficking in heroin in an amount of two grams or more hut less 
than Sl!Ven grnms. I.C. Se>dion :37-27;32B(n)O)(.-\). By statute the crime requires a 
mandatory imposition of a minimum fixed thn'<i-ycar term of impt·isonment and a 
mandatory minimum fine of $10,000.00. The maximum sentence can be life and the 
rnaxinrnrn fine $100,000.00. [•'ollowing lwr guilty plen. the defendant l'l'ceived a 
sc•ntence of :-:uvtm ,\'l'at'S with the fil'st threP .H'IH'S fixed and a fine of $10,000.00. Since 
the defendant's mot ion was fihld afror sentencing, she must show "manifest injustice" 
hd'orP lwr pfr1 11 may be ,vithdrnwn. 1CR 3:1({'.). 
lf a p k•a i;,,1 not taken i.n compliance wi ! h tho c.:onstitutional d uc IH'OCL'!-<S standard 
l hat it lw mado volunra1·ily, knowingly, and intellig-~}ntly, then manifoJst inju:-:t.iee hns 
i 1. . 
; i: 
MAY O 7 2014 
) ) 
been shown. A constitutional due process violation, however, is not necessarily 
required to show manifest injustice. The burden is on the defendant to show a 
justification for withdrawal of a guilty plea. Finally, manifest injustice must be shown 
before a post-sentencing motion may be granted in order to insure that a defendant is 
not entering a guilty plea to test the weight of potential punishment and then seeking 
to withdraw a guilty plea if the sentence is more severe than expected. State v. Stone, 
147 Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734 (Ct. App. 2009, review denied 2009). 
An evidentiaiy hearing took place on January 17, 2014, before Judge Hansen. 
The only testifying witnesses were the defendant and her former attorney, Mr. Bret 
Fox. Final oral argument was scheduled for May 2, 2014, but Judge Hansen was ill on 
that date. I was asked to hear closing argument and to render a decision. Prior to 
making my decision, I took the matter under advisement, reviewed the briefs and 
exhibits, and listened to the tape-recorded transcript of the entire evidentiary hearing. 
Ms. Rose contends that her guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently entered, specifically because she was not aware that a judgment of 
conviction for trafficking in heroin carried with it a mandatory three-year minimum 
fixed sentence. Instead she believed she would be placed on probation, placed in drug 
court, or at worst placed in the retained jurisdiction program. 
At the evidentiary hearing Ms. Rose testified in summary fashion that her 
attorney told her that she might get probation or a retained jurisdiction. 
The state introduced transcripts of arraignment and plea hearings at which Ms. 
MEMORANDUM AMO ORDER 2 
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Rose was advised by various judges on numerous occasions that the trafficking charge 
against her carried with it a mandatory minimum sentence of three years fixed and 
that the sentence could be extended to life. No judge or anyone else in court ever 
suggested to her that she would receive probation, drug court, or a retained 
jurisdiction. 
Mr. Fox testified that he tried without success to get the prosecutor to reduce the 
charge to a crime that did not have a mandatory minimum. He was only able to obtain 
dismissal of other drug-delivery felonies and a recommendation of a sentence of three 
years fixed and five years indete1·minate. He told Ms. Rose in no uncertain terms that 
the chance of getting probation, drug court, or a retained jurisdiction was virtually nil. 
Nevertheless, he did tell her that he would try a "Hail Mary., type of argument to 
convince the judge that Ms. Rose should receive something other than the fixed 
mandatory minimum. At the sentencing hearing Mr. Fox argued strenuously but 
unavailingly against imposition of a fixed minimum sentence. Judge Hansen imposed a 
sentence of three years fixed and four years indeterminate. 
After reviewing the evidence, it is patent that Ms. Rose's claim that she did not 
know that she would receive a fixed minimum sentence of at least three years flies in 
the face ofreality. The probative and believable evidence demonstrates that her guilty 
plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. There was no due process 
violation. In addition there are no other facts that suggest that her plea should be 
withdrawn to "correct manifest injustice." 
MEMORANDUM AMO ORDER 3 
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There has been no showing of manifest injustice. The defendant's motion will be 
denied, and the guilty plea will stand. 
The foregoing memornndum constitutes the court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
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ORDER 
It hereby i.s ordered t lrnt the motion of Snnja Rose to w:ithclra\V her guilty plea is 
denied, the defondnnt ro obtain no relief thereby. 
May 5. 2014 
l\ / ti ,, 
. \; ( { ,/ ( ! 
.. ·/ , \ \ J ., .. .... l. 
George o: Carey, Senior District Jhdge 
M~NORANDUM AMD ORDER 

